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Abstract
This study addresses the question of how established organizations develop new business models over time, 
using a process research approach to trace how four business model innovation trajectories unfold. With 
organizational learning as analytical lens, we discern two process patterns: “drifting” starts with an emphasis 
on experiential learning and shifts later to cognitive search; “leaping,” in contrast, starts with an emphasis 
on cognitive search and shifts later to experiential learning. Both drifting and leaping can result in radical 
business model innovations, while their occurrence depends on whether a new business model takes off 
from an existing model and when it goes into operation. We discuss the implications of these findings for 
theory on business models and organizational learning.
Keywords
business model, cognitive search, experiential learning, innovation, organizational learning, process 
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Introduction
Both scholars and practitioners focus increasingly on business models (BMs) to complement more 
traditional units of analysis, such as the product, firm, industry, or network (Amit and Zott, 2001; 
Arend, 2013; Baden-Fuller and Mangematin, 2013). A BM defines how an organization creates 
and appropriates value and thereby captures essential features of how companies conduct their 
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business (Zott et al., 2011). Innovative BMs constitute significant sources of competitive advan-
tage and firm performance (Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu, 2013; Desyllas and Sako, 2013; Zott and 
Amit, 2007), so organizations are motivated to innovate BMs by making fundamental changes in 
the way they create and appropriate value.
Despite the attractiveness of BM innovation, its pursuit faces substantial challenges and is prone 
to failure (Pauwels and Weiss, 2008). Difficulties arise due to uncertainty about the effectiveness 
of new BMs (Andries and Debackere, 2007) and the complexity of those models, as configurations 
of interdependent BM components (Baden-Fuller and Mangematin, 2013; Klang et al., 2014). 
Interactions among components make the development of an effective configuration more difficult 
because none of the components can be considered in isolation, and their possible interactions 
increase the number of effects to take into account (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000), especially under 
uncertainty, when those interactions remain unknown.
Further complications arise for established firms that develop their new BM in parallel with an 
existing one (Mezger, 2014). BM innovation in established firms may draw on components of an 
existing configuration to create synergies (Kim and Min, 2015; Markides and Charitou, 2004), but 
it also may suffer from forces of inertia acting on its components, as well as potential conflicts 
between old and new BMs (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). These 
challenges raise questions about how established firms might still find ways to pursue BM 
innovation.
So far though, the process of BM innovation in established firms has received insufficient 
research attention (Arend, 2013; Demil et al., 2015). Publications that have attended to the process 
dimensions of BM innovation offer conflicting assumptions and findings: some emphasize the 
design of BMs (e.g. Chatterjee, 2013; Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010), others emphasize emergent, 
iterative processes such as trial-and-error learning and experimentation (Dmitriev et al., 2014; 
McGrath, 2010; Sosna et al., 2010) or suggest that design may be followed by refinement or adjust-
ment after the BM has been implemented (Cortimiglia et al., 2015; Demil and Lecocq, 2010; 
Lehoux et al., 2014). Moreover, only few studies provide comparative investigations of BM inno-
vation in the specific context of established firms (Cortimiglia et al., 2015; Mezger, 2014; Sánchez 
and Ricart, 2010). In particular, we lack insight into how the specific challenges for established 
firms affect the process of innovation as it unfolds over time.
The question that we address in this article is the following: How do business model innovation 
processes unfold over time in established organizations? To answer this question, we investigated 
multiple cases (Eisenhardt, 1989) using a process research approach to trace trajectories of BM 
innovation in established firms (Langley, 1999; Pettigrew, 1990). We considered BM innovation 
relative to a firm’s existing BM(s) (e.g. Massa and Tucci, 2014) and we studied four cases in which 
established firms added a new BM to existing one(s). We use organizational learning theory as an 
analytical lens (Levitt and March, 1988) because several authors have referred to innovation in 
general (e.g. Garud and Van de Ven, 1992), and BM innovation in particular (e.g. Mezger, 2014; 
Sosna et al., 2010) as a learning process. Moreover, we draw on the distinction between cognitive 
search and experiential modes of organizational learning, which have been used before to investi-
gate dynamics in complex systems of interdependent components (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000).
We contribute to literature on BMs in several ways. First, we advance the BM concept by argu-
ing that it has both cognitive and action dimensions, which form a generative duality. Second, we 
provide systematic insights into the processes of BM innovation in established organizations, 
which involve multiple learning mechanisms. This integrates and extends prior studies that suggest 
single modes of learning and shows the distinct and complementary contributions of cognitive 
search and experiential learning mechanisms. Third, we show that these mechanisms combine into 
two distinct patterns that either start from cognitive search and shift to experiential learning (which 
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we label “leaping”) or else start with experiential learning and move to cognitive search (which we 
label “drifting”). The drifting pattern differs from dominant conceptions of BM innovation and 
shows that a process that starts incrementally can also lead to radical BM innovation. We find that 
differences between the leaping and drifting patterns depend on the degree to which a BM innova-
tion trajectory can take off from an existing BM configuration and whether the BM can go into 
operation early. Finally, we explain how the relation of new BMs to existing BMs of established 
organizations affects the BM innovation process.
Theoretical background
Business models
A common feature of BM conceptualizations is that they consider BMs as configurations of multi-
ple components (Baden-Fuller and Mangematin, 2013; Morris et al., 2005). Researchers use vari-
ous labels to characterize BM components (Zott et al., 2011). Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) 
propose a widely used, detailed framework: A value proposition is the core component; activities, 
resources, partnerships, and cost structure are the components needed for value creation; and cus-
tomer segments, customer relationships, distribution channels, and revenue streams define how 
value gets delivered and how some of that value may be captured. This conceptualization is used 
in several academic studies (Cortimiglia et al., 2015; Ghezzi, 2013), and the components can be 
mapped onto other frameworks (Morris et al., 2005; Zott et al., 2011), so it represents a good 
choice for our analysis.
As a configuration of components, a BM involves interdependent strategic decisions. The effec-
tiveness of any set of BM components depends heavily on the interactions among those compo-
nents, as was evident in the example of Polaroid shifting from instant printing photography to 
digital photography, without changing its revenue model (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). This charac-
teristic of BMs—namely, that they feature interdependent components—relates them to broader 
management literature that considers combinations of interdependent decision variables (Billinger 
et al., 2014; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000), which may display complementarities (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1995) or “fit” (Siggelkow, 2001). When a BM achieves fit, it consists of a coherent set of 
reinforcing choices (Morris et al., 2005). Mismatches instead occur when BM components have 
adverse or conflicting implications for other components (Lehoux et al., 2014).
The configurational nature of BMs complicates the process of BM innovation because the 
underlying interactions among BM components may be hard to predict and difficult to change over 
time (Demil and Lecocq, 2010). BM innovation involves changes in multiple components, and the 
eventual outcomes depend on the interactions between all components involved. This adds to the 
uncertainty associated with BM innovation, making it hard to predict a priori whether a particular 
BM will succeed (Andries and Debackere, 2007; Cavalcante et al., 2011; McGrath, 2010).
In established firms that pursue a new BM alongside an existing one, the existing configuration 
of components may help or hinder the establishment of new BMs. A new BM might have synergy 
with the existing model, when the old and the new models share some components, such as tech-
nological resources (Kim and Min, 2015; Markides and Charitou, 2004; Sabatier et al., 2010). The 
existing configuration may also create cognitive inertia because existing BMs shape managerial 
thinking and distort perceptions of novel opportunities (Cavalcante et al., 2011; Tripsas and Gavetti, 
2000). Existing configurations also create structural barriers when new uses of components con-
flict with the relations of those components embedded in the existing configuration (Chesbrough, 
2010). The associated conflicts of interest may create internal resistance (e.g. Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom, 2002).
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BM innovation and organizational learning
To better understand the process of BM innovation, we use organizational learning as a theoretical 
lens, so that we can leverage a fundamental duality. That is, BMs have been conceptualized as both 
cognitive artifacts and patterns of action (Baden-Fuller and Morgan, 2010; Massa and Tucci, 
2014). On the one hand, BMs have been viewed as a cognitive phenomenon (Furnari, 2015; 
Martins et al., 2015) and described as representations (Arend, 2013; Morris et al., 2005; Perkmann 
and Spicer, 2010), cognitive instruments (Baden-Fuller and Mangematin, 2013), heuristics 
(Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002), logics (Teece, 2010), and blueprints (Osterwalder and 
Pigneur, 2010). These views assert that BMs exist in a cognitive domain. On the other hand, the 
concept of BMs is used to refer to what organizations do, such that they have been defined as activ-
ity systems (Zott and Amit, 2010), sets of routines (Winter and Szulanski, 2001), or patterns of 
action (Brousseau and Penard, 2007). We use this duality of representation (cognition) and reality 
(action) as key to understand the process of BM innovation by drawing on literature on organiza-
tional learning.
Cognition and action iterate in processes of organizational learning (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). We 
draw on the distinction between two basic modes of organizational learning: cognitive search and 
experiential learning (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Levitt and March, 1988). In cognitive search, 
action follows cognition; in experiential learning, cognition follows action (Gavetti and Levinthal, 
2000). We use this organizational learning lens to investigate how BM innovation comes about 
through interactions between cognition and action.
Existing literature on how to generate BM innovation can also be categorized according to these 
two modes. Cognitive search refers to a forward-looking process: a cognitive representation is 
used to create and select alternatives according to their consequences. Some studies emphasize the 
primacy of the cognitive domain in BM innovation (Cortimiglia et al., 2015; Furnari, 2015). Aspara 
et al.’s (2011) historical study of Nokia, for example, describes how top managers’ cognitions of 
change in the corporate environment informed their search for and decisions about changes to the 
composition of Nokia’s businesses and their value-creating linkages. Moreover, several normative 
models for designing BMs have been presented that emphasize forward-looking analytical pro-
cesses suggesting that BMs have to be conceived first, then put into action (Chatterjee, 2013; 
Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010).
Experiential learning instead is backward looking. The basic process of experiential learning is 
that past experiences get encoded in routinized actions, such that successful actions are retained, 
and failures are abandoned (Levitt and March, 1988). Indeed, others have described BM innova-
tion as a process that emerges primarily from the domain of action, captured in concepts such as 
experimentation (McGrath, 2010), effectuation (Chesbrough, 2010; Sitoh et al., 2014), and trial-
and-error learning (Mezger, 2014; Sosna et al., 2010). In experiential learning, the relation between 
cognition and action is reversed: action and its effects are the sources of learning. Thus, both cogni-
tive search and experiential learning involve action and cognition, but in opposite sequences.
Experiential learning and cognitive search bring about different dynamics in configurations of 
interdependent components. A basic assumption is that complex interactions among components 
yield “rugged” performance landscapes, in which particular combinations form “local peaks” 
(Levinthal, 1997), depending on the extent and type of interactions (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2007). 
Most research on learning processes in these rugged landscapes focuses on experiential learning 
(Billinger et al., 2014), which is characterized by local search as it responds to outcomes of nearby 
alternatives (Cyert and March, 1963). Especially when complex interactions create local peaks, 
experiential learning may become trapped in one part of the landscape, even if other areas would 
offer better outcomes (Levinthal, 1997).
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In contrast, cognitive representations may help make long jumps to distant parts of the land-
scape (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). Through cognitive search, actors can play around with more 
elements than would be available to them through experiential learning, such that they come up 
with different solutions and outcomes. Cognitive search can be enabled by analogical reasoning 
(Gavetti et al., 2005; Martins et al., 2015) and imitation of others (Rivkin, 2000). Yet, cognitive 
representations are always simplified (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007). 
Especially in uncertain conditions, the effectiveness of strategic search and planning is limited by 
unforeseen contingencies and changes, both within the firm and in its external environment 
(Gruber, 2007; McGrath, 2010; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985).
To advance theoretical understanding of BM innovation processes, we investigate the contribu-
tions and interactions of both cognitive search and experiential learning. Both modes of learning 
have been identified in the BM innovation literature (Martins et al., 2015), and we seek to deter-
mine how they combine and interact in BM innovation processes. Initial theoretical explorations 
offer a foundation by analyzing the interaction of cognition and action over time (Gavetti and 
Levinthal, 2000; Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007). We specify our research question accordingly: How do 
BM innovation processes in established organizations progress through cognitive search and expe-
riential learning over time?
Methods
Our research aim is best characterized as theory elaboration (Vaughan, 1992) with regard to inno-
vation in BMs. Theory elaboration means that our study builds on pre-existing models and concep-
tual ideas and aims to refine concepts, relations, and their explanatory limits (Lee et al., 1999). 
Theory elaboration deploys procedures similar to theory generation (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007; Locke, 2001) and requires a similar open research attitude to avoid premature closure 
(Vaughan, 1992: 176).
To answer our research question, we adopt a process research approach and investigate how BM 
innovation is realized through sequences of events (Langley, 1999; Tsoukas and Chia, 2002). We 
deployed longitudinal studies to depict the evolution of actual processes in their natural environ-
ment. Furthermore, our open and iterative approach to data collection and analysis enables us to 
explore and refine our conceptualization of process dynamics (Strauss, 1987).
The study follows replication logic, investigating multiple independent BM innovation 
trajectories to seek potential corroboration of the findings (Yin, 2008). We used a purposeful 
sampling strategy to select information-rich cases that can reveal insights into issues of impor-
tance to the inquiry (Patton, 2002). We focused on BMs rather than firms and used BM innovation 
trajectories as primary unit of analysis. We selected cases that shared similar features, as that 
allows for meaningful comparison in cross-case analysis and increases the likelihood that simi-
larities and differences between cases have theoretical significance (Gerring, 2007). Specifically, 
we selected cases that met the following criteria: (1) The BM that resulted from the trajectory 
had to be new to the firm, so that BM innovation was both strongly present and transparently 
observable (Pettigrew, 1990); (2) The trajectory also had to be relatively new for its sector and 
therefore a challenging endeavor, with much uncertainty and limited opportunities to imitate 
other firms (Rivkin, 2000); (3) The initiatives had to be undertaken by established firms, which 
had at least one working BM; (4) The trajectories had to be technology intensive to limit variety 
among the cases (Gerring, 2007); and (5) BM innovation had to be recently realized, and firms 
had to approve the non-anonymous disclosure of findings to increase the data collection reliability 
(Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki 2008). We gained in-depth access to four cases that met these crite-
ria, which we introduce below.
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Phenom was a BM innovation trajectory to commercialize a new tabletop scanning electron 
microscope (SEM), later labeled “Phenom.” This trajectory was executed by FEI (established in 
1971; 1700 employees), which was the first organization to introduce such a tabletop SEM. While 
FEI usually focused on increasing performance levels of electron microscopy, the new microscope 
instead filled the performance gap between optical microscopes and low-end electron microscopes 
that were on the market at that time. While it started as a product development trajectory, it eventu-
ally required changes in most of the other BM components, including customer relationships, 
partnerships, and cost structures, due to interdependencies between components. The initiative was 
spun off in the end due to the lack of synergy with FEI’s main BM.
Exhibits.nl was a BM innovation trajectory to commercialize a portfolio of custom-made exhib-
its as standardized exhibits, sold via the Internet, starting in 2005. This new BM was developed by 
Bruns (established in 1963; 70 employees), which mainly focused on creating one-of-a-kind sys-
tems for museums and exhibitions before. For Bruns, all the components of the new “Exhibits.nl” 
BM changed compared to the old BM. The main changes were in the value proposition, new cus-
tomer segments, and revenue model, triggering related adaptations in the other BM components. 
This new model was initiated because management wanted to differentiate, to spread risk, and 
reuse exhibit designs that were developed in one-of-a-kind projects. Bruns was first among its 
competitors to offer both custom-made and standardized exhibits.
MiPlaza was a BM innovation trajectory to commercialize a bundle of research services of 
electronics firm Philips (established 1891; 125,000 employees). For long Philips’ research, activi-
ties were internally oriented and fenced off from the outside world. With this new initiative, even-
tually labeled “MiPlaza,” Philips opened up its research facilities to others—a major step for a 
technology-based firm. Several support departments of Philips’ central research and development 
(R&D) organization started offering research services such as analysis, measurement, and proto-
typing and consulting services to outside parties such as R&D labs of multinationals and start-ups 
to generate new revenues using Philips’ research support infrastructure. In the end, all the BM 
components were changed. Initial adaptations in the value proposition, activities, resources, and 
customers triggered changes in interdependent components such as the development of alternative 
customer relationships and new partnerships. Philips has been considered as a frontrunner in the 
use of such open BMs (Chesbrough and Garman, 2009).
Waste no more was a BM innovation trajectory to commercialize high-quality recycled 
materials and facilitate closed loops, thereby coupling supply and demand of materials for cus-
tomers. This new BM was developed by waste management company Van Gansewinkel (estab-
lished 1964; 5800 employees). BM innovation started with the renewal of activities, resources, 
and revenue streams, which gradually led to necessary changes in other components such as 
customer relationships and partnerships. This initiative was regarded as a means to escape com-
moditization of the waste management market and generate new revenue streams. The innova-
tive nature of Van Gansewinkel’s approach has been acknowledged in a Nature article (Wise 
et al., 2013).
So, these BM innovation trajectories were similar on key dimensions: they resulted in a BM that 
was new to the firm and relatively new to its sector, which was operated within an established firm 
besides an existing BM or a portfolio of BMs, with a significant role for technology. Yet, the cases 
also differed. As a consequence of the selection criterion that the new BM had to be new relative 
to its sector, it was impossible to have cases from the same sector. Moreover, the companies in 
which the BM innovation trajectories were embedded had different sizes, with potential differ-
ences in scope of the existing BM portfolio. This variety adds to the robustness of findings 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), but also opens up the possibility of alternative explanations, to 
which we will return in the Discussion section.
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Data collection
Our data collection focused on tracking changes in BM components and their interdependen-
cies during the new model’s first years of development. Interviews were our primary data 
source, which we triangulated with archival data to enhance validity (Jick, 1979; Yin, 2008). 
We began by interviewing informants who played a central role in the development of the new 
business, according to suggestions from industry contacts and media coverage of the initiatives. 
Then, we applied snowball sampling to identify additional interviewees, following the sugges-
tions made in the initial interviews (Patton, 2002). We sought interviewees with multiple back-
grounds and perspectives, including managers, employees, and external stakeholders involved 
in the BM innovation trajectory. Interviewing multiple informants mitigated the potential biases 
of any individual respondent because the information could be corroborated by several sources 
(Gibbert et al., 2008). At least three sources of information contributed to each episode that we 
analyzed. In total, we interviewed 39 respondents, some of them twice (see Table 1). The inter-
views were recorded and transcribed verbatim (except for a few interviews at one organization 
where some interviewees chose not to allow recording; two interviewers took notes at those 
interviews, which were transcribed within 24 hours). The interviews were conducted in 2011 
and 2012.
The interviews were semi-structured by a protocol to enhance reliability (Yin, 2008). They typi-
cally started with a question asking interviewees to explain their personal background, position, 
and history in the organization. Then they recounted the history of the BM innovation trajectory as 
it unfolded over time. During this explanation, we frequently prompted interviewees for further 
details. In particular, we ensured that they discussed all developments and changes in the BM com-
ponents, including the value proposition, customer segments, distribution channels, customer rela-
tionships, revenue streams, activities, resources, partnerships, and cost structures (Osterwalder and 
Pigneur, 2010). Some interviewees used the term “BM” explicitly to discuss how the business 
initiative differed from their existing business. In other interviews, we prompted respondents to 
specify any differences regarding specific components of their pre-existing BM and how and why 
these differences arose. Our questions aimed to uncover concrete events, factual data, and actual 
behavior, which help increase reporting accuracy (Huber and Power, 1985). Later interviews were 
aided by an emerging timeline, so that interview time could be used effectively to fill gaps in our 
understanding and validate earlier accounts.
We triangulated these interview data with both internal and external archival data (see Table 1), 
such as business plans, presentations, annual reports, company brochures, press releases, media 
articles, and public interviews about the new BM, its host organization, or direct competitors (Jick, 
1979). These sources of data helped specify and verify dates of events and develop a reliable chro-
nology of the BM innovation trajectory. The same documents also helped us prepare for inter-
views, in that they provided background and in-depth insights. Overall, the combination of 
interview and archival data enabled a rich, reliable understanding of the BM innovation 
trajectories.
Data analysis
The first step in our analysis involved within-case analyses to develop comprehensive case narra-
tives (Eisenhardt, 1989; Langley, 1999). These case descriptions contained the original BM(s) of 
the organization and the development of the new BM. Both were described according to the BM 
components identified by Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010), whose conceptualization offers an 
effective tool for communicating with practitioners. Moreover, the initial case descriptions 
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Table 1. Data sources.
Case Informants (ID) Additional data sources
Phenom (FEI)
 
 
Project leader Phenom
Purchasing manager FEI
Marketing manager Phenom
Mechanical architect Phenom
Senior VP FEI
Project leader supplier A
Director supplier A
Researcher FEI
Project leader supplier B
Project leader industrial design agency
Project leader regional development 
agency
Annual reports (2000–2011)
Press coverage (newspapers 2000–
2011, magazines)
Company documents (business plan, 
brochures, presentations)
Regional development program 
documentation
Press releases
Follow-up conversations
 
Exhibits.nl (Bruns)
 
 
 
 
 
 
Director (2)
Commercial director (2)
Project director
Sales manager
Customer of the new and old business 
model
Project engineer
Manager of operations
Annual reports (2008, 2009, 2010)
Company documents (brochures, 
organizational chart, project portfolio)
Press coverage (newspapers 2000–
2011, interview with director)
YouTube presentation
Industry newsletters (2002–2011) 
MiPlaza (Philips)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VP research services
Communications manager
Business development manager
Philips Researcher
Business excellence manager
Client of research services
Chief Operations Officer
Business developer science park
Philips Researcher
Annual reports (2000–2011)
Press coverage (newspapers 2000–
2011, magazines)
Company documents (internal magazine 
2004–2009, presentations, master 
theses, service brochures)
Scientific articles
Press releases 
‘Waste no More’ 
(Van Gansewinkel) 
 
Director Centre of Expertise (2)
Manager Organizational Development
HR Director
Manager service delivery
Business architect ICT
Manager business applications
Business development manager
Assistant to the CEO
Director corporate communications
Project manager
Annual reports (2001–2011)
Press coverage (newspapers 2000–
2011, magazines)
Company documents (presentations, 
business plan, master theses)
Press releases
 
 Marketing manager  
 Business development manager  
HR: human resource; ICT: information and communications technology.
contained an overview of each BM innovation trajectory. We sent each case description to key 
informants at the pertinent organization to check for validity (Gibbert et al., 2008). Their feedback 
resulted in minor revisions to the case narratives.
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As the second step in the within-case analysis, we analyzed BM innovation trajectories as 
sequences of learning episodes, similar to Bingham and Davis (2012). We identified distinct learn-
ing episodes in the case histories as embedded unit of analysis (Yin, 2008), which formed the basis 
for further process analyses (Langley, 1999; Poole et al., 2000). Learning episodes involved a 
coherent set of actions, analyses, reflections, or proposals that resulted in, or were based on, 
increased understanding. Moreover, episodes had to be significant to the development of the new 
BM, such that they affected the direction and progress of the trajectory. Some unfolded as longer 
term trends; for these episodes, we dated the moment they first emerged. The resulting sequences, 
which included between 9 and 31 episodes each, mapped the evolution of the new BM. We main-
tained the chain of evidence to ensure construct validity (Yin, 2008); for each episode, we noted 
relevant data sources, and we coded interview segments pertaining to each episode in qualitative 
data analysis software.
In the third step, we operationalized the two basic types of organizational learning by distin-
guishing specific learning mechanisms. The identification of mechanisms was based on the itera-
tive combination of prior literature and our empirical data. Using open, inductive analysis as 
complement to previous theory enables “extending and refining … existing theoretical categories 
and relationships” (Locke, 2001: 103). We systematically compared episodes and discussed them 
in the research team (Strauss, 1987) and related these episodes where possible to learning mecha-
nisms known from literature without restricting ourselves to a predefined set of categories. This 
process resulted in a framework of four mechanisms used by the established organizations to 
develop and refine new BM configurations. Table 2 contains the coding scheme, including the defi-
nitions of the mechanisms, empirical indicators for each mechanism, and illustrative quotes. More 
quotes related to the different mechanisms appear in Appendix 1.
Two mechanisms are characterized primarily by cognitive search: conceptualization and crea-
tion. Conceptualization refers to the development of concepts, ideas, and analyses for one or more 
BM components and their interactions, without actually changing or creating any of the compo-
nents. Conceptualization may occur before any aspect of the BM gets implemented. As such, it has 
been described as “learning-before-doing” by Pisano (1994). Conceptualization may also concern 
the reconceptualization of existing operations, as reinterpretation of past and present can be a key 
learning process (Hernes and Irgens, 2013). Creation refers in this study to the actual realization of 
new BM components or a new, essential part of components, primarily informed by preceding 
analyses of components and the interactions among them. While it shares with conceptualization 
that it is rooted in cognitive search, creation means that ideas are also implemented in reality. As 
such, it relates to what Miner and Mezias (1996) call “generative learning.” Creation primarily 
relies on cognitive search through the ideation and analysis of BM components and their relation 
with other components.
Two other mechanisms characterize experiential learning: adaptation and experimentation. 
Adaptation means changing BM components and their interactions according to experiences gath-
ered while the BM was in operation. The adaptation of BM components can be more or less radical, 
in reaction to misfits or (partly) positive outcomes. It covers what others have called trial-and-error 
learning (Bingham and Davis, 2012; Sosna et al., 2010). Experimentation, or experimental learn-
ing (Bingham and Davis, 2012), entails purposeful actions to learn: planning, designing, and exe-
cuting relatively controlled situations to develop new knowledge and validate existing forms. 
Similar to adaptation, experimentation relies on learning from experience, but experimental learn-
ing differs because it only concerns experiences that are intentionally evoked with learning as main 
purpose.
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Table 2. Coding scheme.
Learning mode Mechanism Description Empirical indicators Illustrative quote #
Cognitive 
search
Conceptualization Development of 
concepts, ideas 
and analyses for 
one or more BM 
components and 
their relationships, 
without actually 
changing or 
creating any of the 
components.
Conceiving and 
formulating a new 
value proposition and 
relations with other BM 
components
“We had the 
vision about 
a cheap SEM, 
but it was not 
a product. It 
only became a 
product when we 
started to think 
about use cases. 
Who might be 
using it, for what 
purpose?”
11
 Reconceptualizing BM 
components based on 
analysis.
 
 Determining costs and 
revenue model based on 
market analysis.
 
 Brainstorming to 
come up with possible 
products/services.
 
 Market research to test 
customer needs, define 
customer segments.
 
Creation Creating new BM 
components or a 
new, essential part 
of components, 
informed by 
ideas and 
analyses about 
components and 
relations between 
components.
Developing technological 
resources to realize 
value proposition, based 
on an analysis of available 
and needed resources.
“First our [new] 
business was 
owned by two 
companies. 
We developed 
the products 
together with a 
design agency to 
create a certain 
look and feel.”
15
 Setting up partnership 
to create or deliver 
value together, based 
on analysis of mutual 
benefits.
 
 Setting up a distribution 
channel to deliver new 
offerings to (envisioned) 
customers.
 
 Creating and formalizing 
business processes 
based upon analysis of 
current processes and 
envisioned BM
 
Experiential 
learning
Adaptation Changing BM 
components 
based upon 
experiences 
gathered while 
the BM was in 
operation.
Introducing new 
organization structure 
based on bad 
performance of current 
structure.
Introducing changes in 
product and production 
after experiences with 
selling product.
Ending partnership 
based on actual 
performance.
“So we aimed 
to capture part 
of the high-
end optical 
microscopy 
market. That was 
a mistake, a huge 
mistake. The 
idea was OK, but 
those people did 
not understand 
what a SEM could 
do for them”
14
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Learning mode Mechanism Description Empirical indicators Illustrative quote #
 Creating additional 
capacity based on a 
growing business.
 
  
  
 Reformulating value 
proposition based on 
customer interaction.
 
 Changing customer 
segments based upon 
sales experiences.
 
 Changing business 
activities, distribution 
channels to reduce 
costs.
 
Experimentation Purposeful actions 
to learn and 
validate: planning, 
designing, 
and executing 
relatively 
controlled 
situations to 
develop new 
knowledge.
Developing a technology 
demonstrator to 
illustrate working 
technology.
“Early projects 
were executed to 
see if there was a 
concrete business 
case which could 
justify further 
investments.”
4
 Asking prototype 
feedback from 
customers.
 
 Trying out new 
distribution channels.
 
 Performing exploratory 
projects as a proof of 
concept of new BM.
 
BM: business model.
Table 2. (Continued)
The fourth step in the analysis involved coding all learning episodes with this set of mecha-
nisms, as well as coding the BM component(s) in each of the four trajectories. Coding the dis-
tinct episodes required understanding of prior developments in the case history (Pettigrew, 1990) 
and the use of multiple data sources (Pratt, 2009). This holistic understanding was aided by 
integrating interpretations of multiple researchers. Coding was performed by two members of 
the research team who had been involved in data collection and at least one additional researcher, 
who was more distant and could serve as a “devil’s advocate” and challenge interpretations 
(Nemeth et al., 2001). These analytical steps involved iterations, and the final coding process 
resulted in some refinements to the prior identification of learning episodes in the BM innova-
tion trajectories.
As the final step in the analysis, we compared the four learning trajectories to gain insights into 
how BM innovation trajectories unfold over time. We first compared the distribution of dominant 
mechanisms in the episodes over the BM innovation trajectories. Next, we compared the four BM 
innovation trajectories for continuity and change in the learning mechanisms, grouped into the two 
overarching learning modes. This step led to the identification of two main patterns, each of which 
fits two cases. Finally, we explained both patterns according to the specific conditions of the BM 
innovation trajectories.
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Findings
Learning trajectories in the BM innovation process
The four BM innovation trajectories consisted of multiple episodes (42 in total), characterized by 
a multitude of dynamics. Appendix 1 contains for each BM innovation trajectory the key episodes 
in chronological order. These episodes map the evolution of the new BM, and for each episode, 
we identified which learning mechanism dominated. Although highlighting a single mechanism 
in each episode meant abstracting away from some of the complexities in the case histories, it also 
enabled a better view of the overall trajectory. For each episode, Appendix 1 also indicates the 
BM component(s) addressed in that episode and the interactions between these components as 
changes unfolded, together with illustrative quotes. Appendix 2 gives for each innovation trajec-
tory an overview of the original BM that was most related to the new BM at the start of the tra-
jectory, and, at the right-hand side of the table, the final BM components at the end of the BM 
innovation trajectory. The tables summarize for each learning episode the BM components that 
evolved during that episode. Appendix 2 shows that many BM components evolved several times 
over the innovation trajectory, indicating processual relationships across episodes. Appendix 2 
also indicates that multiple BM components are touched upon in individual episode due to inter-
actions between these components. These interactions are further explained for each episode in 
Appendix 1.
Patterns emerge when we shift attention from episodes to the full trajectories. We find two dis-
tinct patterns that characterize learning trajectories according to cognitive search and experiential 
learning: two of the four trajectories—FEI’s Phenom and Bruns’ Exhibits.nl—initially emphasized 
cognitive search mechanisms (conceptualization and creation), then shifted to experiential learning 
mechanisms (adaptation and experimentation), but the other two cases—Philips’ MiPlaza and Van 
Gansewinkel’s “Waste no More”—initially emphasized learning from experiences and only later 
shifted more toward cognitive search.
Pattern 1: from cognitive search to experiential learning
FEI’s Phenom and Bruns’ Exhibits.nl trajectories began with emphasis on cognitive search. The 
Phenom trajectory started as a product development activity but turned into a radically different 
BM, which eventually spun off (similar to cases described by Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002). 
As Appendix 2 shows, all its BM components changed over time. For a long time, the core value 
proposition of FEI had been to offer high-end SEM systems, incorporating the latest developments 
to increase image quality on sub-micron and atomic levels. Customers included leading research 
institutes, universities, national laboratories, and industrial companies, which employ dedicated 
microscopists for research and development.
By 1995, the company had pushed the boundaries of miniaturization and developed an electron 
microscopy column about the size of a cigar. After a failed application in the semiconductor indus-
try, around 2003–2004, FEI began to conceptualize an easy-to-use, tabletop SEM. This trajectory 
continued with creation processes, as researchers worked to realize breakthroughs deemed neces-
sary to develop a relatively inexpensive, usable system around the small column. Partial success 
spurred multiple episodes of conceptualization and creation, in which FEI started to develop a 
business plan, analyzed pricing and potential customers, and formulated a tentative value proposi-
tion, such that the tabletop concept might fill the gap between optical and electron microscopy. 
These BM components and interactions were designed on the basis of collected information, 
including interviews with about 35 potential customers. Early in 2005, FEI articulated a product 
concept, called Phenom, and a business owner and developer were appointed to manage the devel-
opment of the concept, as well as its introduction into the market.
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Meanwhile, top managers at FEI also started arguing that a low-cost SEM did not really fit 
FEI’s culture. To be manufactured, Phenom would require operations vastly different from FEI’s 
traditional BM of highly customized, low-volume production, shifting to much more cost-efficient, 
mid-volume production. Early in 2005, FEI’s business developer contacted a consortium of small 
suppliers that had joined forces in an effort to become knowledge-intensive system suppliers 
(Table 4, episode 4). The consortium previously had approached FEI seeking actual projects to 
work on, and Phenom offered a mutually beneficial opportunity. Several consortium members 
agreed to co-invest under a risk–reward model to help develop the tabletop SEM. This unantici-
pated partnership could solve both FEI’s financing and culture problems, while the suppliers gained 
an opportunity to demonstrate their capabilities.
After this period of predominantly cognitive search, the Phenom trajectory entered several epi-
sodes of experimentation and adaptation that moved it further beyond product development into 
BM innovation. In 2006, the team at FEI was ready to test a prototype of the new tabletop SEM as 
well as the associated value proposition of the BM. In an experimental setup with defined customer 
segments, FEI approached potential users to test the value proposition of a beta version.
The product’s market launch triggered several episodes, from which the Phenom team learned 
and engaged in adaptation and experimentation. The Phenom microscope was introduced in 
Germany in October 2006, then in the United States in June 2007. However, it failed to meet sales 
targets: instead of 2500 systems, only a few hundred systems had shipped by the end of 2008. The 
development of this new market appeared harder than anticipated because of FEI’s inexperience 
selling the system, as well as the emerging global financial crisis. Team members learned that FEI’s 
distribution structure and sales approach, which were leveraged from the traditional business to the 
new BM, were better suited for selling large, complex microscopes than tabletop microscopes. 
Because Phenom was not profitable and did not fit the existing FEI sales organization, FEI spun 
off Phenom in a structure in which FEI and the supplier partners remained shareholders. Thus, 
overall, the Phenom case started with conceptualization and creation episodes and turned more 
toward experimentation and adaptation in the second half of the trajectory.
Bruns’ Exhibits.nl trajectory displayed a similar shift from cognitive search to experiential 
learning. Initially, Bruns developed tailor-made, interactive exhibits for large museums, science 
centers, visitor centers, and traveling exhibitions, mainly in Western Europe. It worked closely 
with clients and was paid on a project basis. The new BM trajectory was initiated in 2006, when 
senior management began looking for ways to increase income predictability, noting the severe 
risk of large, one-of-a-kind projects. They also wanted to leverage their excess manufacturing 
capacity in their low season and reuse designs. In early conceptualization and creation episodes in 
2006 and 2007, Bruns conceived a new BM, later named Exhibits.nl. Instead of offering tailor-
made, interactive exhibits, Exhibits.nl would provide standardized, economically priced, shock-
proof exhibits, purchased online, with limited after-sales service. Bruns analyzed the kind of 
customers that might value such standardized exhibits (e.g. smaller museums and science centers) 
and which of its existing exhibits might be standardized (with a fee paid to the original client). It 
developed a website and a stand at an annual trade fair as sales channels and then created a partner-
ship with a design agency to enhance redesign capabilities. The BM went into operation in 2007, 
followed by several episodes of adaptation to develop it further. For example, in 2007, much of the 
interest for Bruns’ new value proposition originated from emerging economies in the Middle East, 
South America, and Asia, according to website data. Therefore, it shifted its attention to these parts 
of the world, enabled by the transactional customer relationships it established through its new, 
web-enabled BM, which did not require much interaction or after-sales service. Bruns also learned 
that it did not need the design agency with which it had initiated Exhibits.nl, leading to the dissolu-
tion of this partnership, but it required intensified marketing efforts. So, whereas cognitive search 
dominated in the early episodes, experiential learning came to the fore in the later episodes.
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Pattern 2: from experiential learning to cognitive search
Two other trajectories display a different pattern. Philips’ MiPlaza and Van Gansewinkel’s “Waste 
no More” emphasized experiential learning, rather than cognitive search, in the early phases. Both 
started with a reconceptualization of an existing situation, followed by a period dominated by 
experiential learning. Cognitive search intensified only in the later phases.
The MiPlaza trajectory at Philips began with the recognition that selling research support ser-
vices represented a business opportunity, in an episode of conceptualization. In the early 2000s, as 
open innovation became a buzzword, Philips opened its research campus and embraced a strategy 
of open innovation. It reinterpreted existing activities, such as incidental provisions of research 
services to spin-offs and other interconnected companies, as manifestations of an open innovation 
paradigm. Acts initially performed as a favor to old colleagues and friends became viewed as a 
novel BM, already in operation in an embryonic form. Therefore, Philips officially opened a new 
clean room and related research services for outside companies and research institutes under the 
name MiPlaza in June 2004. Shortly thereafter, Philips’ MiPlaza trajectory featured several epi-
sodes of adapting BM components and their interactions, triggered by the growing business and 
broadening client base. Specifically, Philips initiated partnerships with equipment manufacturers, 
developed additional resources, and strengthened customer relationships.
After these episodes, its cognitive search intensified and became dominant. In 2006, MiPlaza’s 
senior management realized that the current model was too loosely defined, which led them to 
initiate a “One MiPlaza” change program, based on an analysis of MiPlaza’s current situation. On 
the basis of this analysis, the company conceptualized several changes to BM components and 
developed a change plan. This change plan then triggered three creation episodes in 2008 that 
strengthened MiPlaza’s value proposition and customer relationships, while also developing new 
resources and activities, such as a “process house” and ongoing process analysis. The MiPlaza 
trajectory thus started with reconceptualization of existing activities, followed by several episodes 
of adaptation, and turned to an emphasis on conceptualization and creation in later episodes.
Similarly, Van Gansewinkel’s “Waste no More” trajectory displayed a broad shift from experien-
tial learning to cognitive search. It also started with reconceptualization. Van Gansewinkel already 
had a small recycling operation, able to offer raw materials such as glass that was regarded as a by-
product of the company’s core service, namely, collecting and processing customer waste. Rising 
raw materials prices led it to review its activities in a new light. Inspired by a high-profile television 
documentary “Waste Equals Food,” Van Gansewinkel employees came to see their existing opera-
tions as a materials supplier BM that could compete in the raw materials market. Thus, they appreci-
ated existing raw materials activities and strengthened their importance. The documentary features 
Dr. Michael Braungart of the Environmental Protection Encouraging Agency (EPEA), a German 
non-profit institute, promoting a “cradle-to-cradle” philosophy. To accelerate its transformation, 
Van Gansewinkel enthusiasts created a collaboration with EPEA. The subsequent episodes were 
highly experiential, such that employees experimented with projects and adapted the structure to 
control the projects. In later phases, Van Gansewinkel’s “Waste no More” trajectory showed several 
episodes of cognitive search, using conceptualization to strengthen the BM as material supplier and 
creation to develop resources and systematize activities. Experiential learning thus was stronger in 
the early episodes, but the use of cognitive search dominated in the later ones.
Comparison of patterns
In this section, we explain the contrasting sequences of learning mechanisms in the BM innovation 
trajectories and label the two types of trajectories as “leaping” and “drifting.” We characterize the 
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trajectories that started from cognitive search and moved to experiential learning as “leaping” 
because they only leveraged a limited number of resources from the traditional business and mainly 
start with the conceptualization and creation of new BM components, thereby distancing from the 
existing model right from the start, only to shift to experiential learning after going into operation. 
We characterize the trajectories that relied mainly on experiential learning initially and moved later 
to cognitive search as “drifting” because they gradually drift from the original model while being 
in operation and shift to cognitive search to systematize the model when scaling up later in the 
process. Below, we first explain the differences in the first parts of the trajectories and then analyze 
the shift that occurs in both patterns. Table 3 provides an overview of the differences between these 
two types of trajectories.
A key difference between the initiation of the patterns concerns the relationship with the exist-
ing businesses that the organizations had in operation: drifting originates from an existing BM 
configuration, whereas leaping mainly starts by developing new interdependent BM components. 
The two trajectories that we label as drifting–Philips’ MiPlaza and Van Gansewinkel’s “Waste no 
more”–originated from ongoing business. Through reconceptualization, they regarded their ongo-
ing business in a new light, shifting attention to alternative value propositions that could sprout 
from their existing business activities. When Philips’ R&D organization shifted from an internal 
provider of research services to providing services to external clients, it used most of the BM con-
figuration that was already in place (e.g. resources, activities, and relations with external parties), 
although some of those components changed substantially later on. Similarly, Van Gansewinkel 
worked with existing clients, customer relationships, channels, activities, and resources to develop 
its new value proposition. In this drifting process, the role of some of these components changed. 
Notably, customers of waste collection services were reframed in the new BM as suppliers of raw 
materials. Although Philips’ MiPlaza and Van Gansewinkel’s “Waste no More” moved far away 
from the existing BM over time, they took off from an existing, ongoing BM, thereby starting BM 
innovation “on the fly.”
In contrast, the trajectories at Bruns (Exhibits.nl) and FEI (Phenom), which we label as “leap-
ing,” mainly started with the offline development of several new BM components, including the 
products that the BMs evolved from and the channels to bring the products to new customers. BM 
innovation in Bruns’ Exhibits.nl and FEI’s Phenom constituted more de novo developments.
Relatedly, the patterns show different moments of going into operation: drifting trajectories are 
in operation early and leaping trajectories are in operation relatively late. When BM innovation can 
take off from ongoing business, a firm can operationalize an integral BM early, as was the case in 
Philips’ MiPlaza and Van Gansewinkel’s “Waste no More” trajectories. BM development thus took 
place in the midst of ongoing operations for clients. In contrast, in FEI’s Phenom and Bruns’ 
Exhibits.nl trajectories, BM components were developed first, which were put into operation later. 
These cases had to deal with the sequential dependence of the development of BM components: 
The realization of one component may be necessary before other elements can be realized (Sánchez 
and Ricart, 2010). For example, for FEI’s Phenom, the technology had to be developed first to be 
sure that technological resources could support the imagined value proposition. Then, the founda-
tions of other components needed to be developed, such as exploring distribution partnerships 
before going into operation. For Bruns, developing a partnership with a design agency to realize 
the look and feel of the business was a prerequisite before it could develop the website for Exhibits.nl. 
These sequences of developing individual BM components implied a later moment of going into 
operation.
It is easy to see how the sequence of learning processes is influenced by the degree to which 
the new BM develops from existing business and by the moment of going into operation. Taking 
off from existing business allows going in operation early and that enables learning about a 
 at Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen on October 17, 2016soq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
196 Strategic Organization 14(3)
functioning BM from experience. All cases include episodes of adaptation to unexpected problems 
or opportunities, which led to further development of the BMs. The earlier a BM is in operation, 
the sooner such adaptive learning is possible. The trajectories that started with reconceptualization 
of existing activities for novel BMs thus enabled earlier experiential learning. In contrast, the other 
trajectories did not originate from ongoing business and went in operation later and therefore relied 
more on cognitive search initially.
The second part of the explanation of the two patterns centers on the opposite shifts in learning 
mode that occurred roughly halfway along the trajectories: from experiential learning to cognitive 
search in the drifting pattern and from cognitive search to experiential learning in the leaping pat-
tern. These shifts have different triggers.
The drifting pattern shifts from experiential learning to cognitive search when scaling up the 
BM. In Van Gansewinkel’s “Waste no More” trajectory, the shift occurred in episode 6. In episodes 
3 and 4, Van Gansewinkel experimented with a new value proposition, and in episode 5, they 
adapted their organizational structure to further develop new activities. After experimental projects 
had been undertaken, Van Gansewinkel decided to scale up this new BM as exemplary for a new 
identity. This triggered episodes of cognitive search to systematically advance the BM. In particu-
lar, episode 8 concerned a systematic analysis of the markets that would be attractive for the firm’s 
new identity as a materials supplier, sharpening the value proposition for customer segments, and 
further specification of the revenue model and cost structure to make the new BM financially via-
ble. Episode 9 further crystallized the internal activities and resources required for a full-scale BM.
Similarly, after Philips’ MiPlaza BM had been in operation for some time, the decision to scale 
up around episode 6 triggered a shift from predominantly experiential learning to predominantly 
cognitive search. This was enabled by the organizational allocation of responsibility for the new 
activities in episode 5. The decision to scale up the BM created the need to analyze customer needs 
more rigorously, to determine training demands, design a “process house” to formalize internal 
business processes in pursuit of formal certification, and strengthen customer relationships in the 
following episodes.
Table 3. Comparison of two patterns.
Drifting Leaping
Initiation of process Initiated by reconceptualization of 
business model and its opportunities
Initiated by conceptualization of new 
value proposition
Learning processes Early emphasis on experiential learning, 
later emphasis on cognitive search
Early emphasis on cognitive search, 
later emphasis on experiential learning
Relation to existing 
business model(s)
Originating in an existing BM, by reusing 
several interdependent components 
and changing few components through 
experiential learning.
Offline development of new BM 
components, while leveraging some 
independent components (e.g. 
resources)
Moment of going in 
operation
Early in operation Later in operation
Shift between learning 
modes
Triggered by scaling up the BM, requiring 
more systematic consideration of BM 
configuration
Triggered by putting the BM in 
operation, requiring adaptation 
of individual components in the 
configuration
Cases MiPlaza (Philips), “Waste no More” (Van 
Gansewinkel)
Phenom (FEI), Exhibits.nl (Bruns)
BM: business model.
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In both trajectories that followed the drifting pattern, the early episodes of experiential learning 
focused on one or two components and limited interactions at a time (see Appendix 2), such as 
experimenting with the value proposition for Van Gansewinkel’s “Waste no More” BM. Such 
experiential learning regarding few components occurred against the backdrop of the overall con-
figuration, like varying a single parameter in a system while keeping the other parameters stable. 
Scaling up required more systematic conceptualizations and analyses, and later cognitive search 
mechanisms dealt with the interaction of more BM components and thus a larger search space.
The leaping pattern makes the opposite shift, from cognitive search to experiential learning, 
triggered by the new BM going into operation, which occurred in episode 6 of Bruns’ Exhibits.nl 
trajectory and at episode 9 of the FEI’s Phenom trajectory. Going into operation spurred more 
experiential learning episodes prompted by misfits among initial BM components that emerged 
during actual operation. For example, late in its trajectory, FEI recognized that the sales channels 
and customer relationships that were leveraged from the existing business did not fit the novel BM 
for the Phenom microscope. Bruns (Exhibits.nl) only realized that its partnership with the design 
agency (which owned 50% of the business) was of limited value after its BM had been in full 
operation for several years.
The leaping pattern is also different in terms of the number of components and interactions per 
episode. The early cognitive search episodes in Bruns’ Exhibits.nl and FEI’s Phenom trajectories 
that occurred when the BMs were not yet in operation for clients involved multiple BM compo-
nents, configuring the BM as interacting variables. While a larger number of BM components as 
well as their interactions are considered initially in the leaping pattern, during actual operation, it 
shifts to the fine-tuning of specific components.
Discussion
Our study responds to recent calls for research to enhance theoretical understanding of the pro-
cesses of BM innovation in established firms (Arend, 2013; Demil et al., 2015; Massa and Tucci, 
2014). We find a “drifting” pattern that originates from an existing BM configuration, goes early 
into operation, emphasizes experiential learning in early phases, and shifts to cognitive search 
when an organization aims to scale up the BM. In contrast, a “leaping” pattern is mainly initiated 
by developing new BM components, goes into operation relatively late, focuses initially on cogni-
tive search, and shifts to experiential learning after the BM goes in operation. Our findings offer 
several specific contributions to literature on BM innovation and organizational learning.
First, we advance the BM concept by detailing how its cognition and action dimensions form a 
generative duality. This duality can go unnoticed if BMs are in full operation and cognitive repre-
sentations resemble the manifest operational reality. In the process of BM innovation, though, 
differences exist between cognition and action, which make that a BM cannot be reduced to either 
of these dimensions. A BM is more than what an organization does because current actions may not 
yet reflect a BM as conceived, and ongoing activities can be interpreted in multiple ways as dem-
onstrated by the reconceptualizations that initiated BM innovations at Van Gansewinkel and 
Philips. Nor can a BM be reduced to a cognitive representation though because interdependencies 
among components may be only partially conceived, and understanding of a model may rely on it 
being embedded in practice. Thus, whereas some researchers emphasize BMs as patterns of action 
(e.g. Winter and Szulanski, 2001; Zott and Amit, 2010) and others consider them cognitive artifacts 
(e.g. Baden-Fuller and Mangematin, 2013; Martins et al., 2015), we argue that a BM cannot be 
reduced to either organizational actions or cognitive representations but should be understood as a 
duality. Moreover, the duality of these two dimensions makes BMs inherently dynamic and genera-
tive. This generative duality reflects the generative dynamics of organizational routines as general 
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patterns and specific actions (Feldman and Pentland, 2003). In BM innovation, cognition and 
action interact over time to generate new configurations: Actions get reinterpreted, new ideas are 
implemented and examined in action, and new patterns of action result in experiences that lead to 
altered conceptualizations of actual and possible business activities. Understanding these dynam-
ics requires attention to both dimensions of BMs’ dual nature.
Second, we show that BM innovation emerges through combinations of different learning mech-
anisms–each involving a different interaction of cognition and action. Prior studies tend to use sin-
gle process characterizations, focusing on either cognitive search by emphasizing BM design (e.g. 
Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010) or experiential processes such as experimentation (McGrath, 2010) 
or trial-and-error learning (Sosna et al., 2010). We show that BM innovation processes cannot be 
captured with a single mechanism because they involve multiple, contrasting mechanisms in a series 
of episodes. Each learning episode concerns a subset of BM components and the complete configu-
ration of components develops across multiple episodes (see also Cortimiglia et al., 2015).
In all trajectories, both cognitive search and experiential learning appeared necessary–albeit in 
different sequences. Our findings corroborate the assumption in simulation studies that experiential 
learning typically involves a more limited set of decision parameters than cognitive search, as it is 
easier to manipulate variables in thought than in reality (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). Experiential 
learning mechanisms address a few BM components, improving their fit in an integral BM. Cognitive 
search mechanisms address more BM components at the same time and are thereby more concerned 
with the overall configuration of components and their interdependencies. Thus, our findings show 
the distinct, complementary contributions of cognitive search and experiential learning to deal with 
the configurational complexity of BMs. This also implies that our findings do not just resemble the 
distinction between emergent and deliberate strategy formation (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) 
because all trajectories involve emergence and deliberation, albeit in different sequences.
Third, we identify two process patterns, which we labeled leaping and drifting, with contrasting 
sequences of cognitive search and experiential learning. The leaping pattern moves from cognitive 
search to experiential learning. In these trajectories, the BM components and their interdependen-
cies are considered and created upfront. A shift occurs when the BM goes into operation, after 
which experiential learning helps fine-tune any specific components that do not fit within the con-
figuration. This sequence corresponds to those who argue that fine-tuning or adaptation may be 
needed after designed BMs are implemented (Cortimiglia et al., 2015; Lehoux et al., 2014).
The drifting pattern is an alternative trajectory that is not explicitly considered in current literature. 
This pattern, in which emphasis shifts from experiential learning to cognitive search, seems typical 
for established firms because it originates from ongoing business activities. The pattern poses two 
puzzles, though. First, it seems surprising that experiential learning enables substantial divergence 
from the initial BM because existing theory suggests that experiential learning cannot escape a local 
peak (Levinthal, 1997) and that “revolutionary” approaches are asked for BM innovation (Arend, 
2013: 394). A key lies in the use of reconceptualization to initiate BM change. Reinterpreting a cur-
rent configuration, inspired by the concept of “open innovation” by Philips’ MiPlaza and “cradle-to-
cradle” by Van Gansewinkel, changes the performance landscape. Seen in a new light, the contributions 
of the components to BM performance and their interdependencies change, and the existing configu-
ration no longer offers a local optimum. Moreover, both companies had less stringent demands on 
profitability in this period of experiential learning, thereby also reducing the “pull” of a prior local 
optimum. Changes in individual components triggered changes in interdependent components 
through experiential learning, prompting a greater drift away from the prior equilibrium. Thus, even 
though drifting takes off from ongoing business, it allows to deviate radically from it in the end.
Another surprising observation is that the drifting trajectories, which emphasize experiential 
learning in the early episodes, also feature a notable shift to cognitive search later in 
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their trajectories. This shift toward cognitive search has not been documented by those who have 
emphasized the experiential nature of BM innovation (e.g. McGrath, 2010; Sosna et al., 2010). After 
adaptation and experimentation with core components (e.g. value proposition, customer segments) 
showed promising results, the organizations aimed to scale up their new BM operations and thus had 
to deal with new interdependencies. Minimal experimentation could tolerate inconsistencies; scal-
ing up required more thorough alignment of all BM components. Thus, the organizational actors 
used cognitive search to align a larger set of BM components systematically and as a coherent 
configuration.
Overall, this pattern resonates with recent studies of organizational change that document that 
incremental changes may culminate into radical change (Girod and Whittington, 2015; Plowman 
et al., 2007). Besides revealing a similar phenomenon for BM innovation, we specify that drifting 
from an existing BM through subsequent emergent processes may be followed by a more system-
atic analytical approach to consolidate the new BM as a radical departure from the past. These 
findings suggest that drifting can be used by incumbent firms to overcome barriers for BM innova-
tion (Chesbrough, 2010) as the initial reconceptualization addresses cognitive constraints upfront 
and the gradual process makes it easier to legitimize the ultimately radical BM change.
Fourth, our study contributes to the literature on synergies between different BMs of one firm. 
Prior literature suggests that when established firms add new BMs and operate multiple BMs simul-
taneously, they are more successful if the models are connected (Casadesus-Masanell and Tarzijan, 
2012; Markides and Oyon, 2010; Sabatier et al., 2010). Indeed, such connections were evident in the 
reuse of components in both patterns. Synergies occurred most immediately in the drifting pattern, 
where linkages between old and new resulted from reconceptualizations of a significant part of the 
existing business as a new BM, such that familiar components gained new meaning.
Literature mostly assumes that the synergies become enacted whenever a certain component of 
one BM can be directly reused in the other BM that the firm employs, for example, when certain 
resources can be shared (e.g. Markides and Charitou, 2004). However, in two cases, we observed 
an indirect reuse, when a certain component of the old BM (i.e. customer segment) became a dif-
ferent component in the new BM (i.e. partners). Moreover, we observed that adaptation frequently 
occurred when direct reuse of a BM component resulted in misfits instead of synergy. Adaptation 
of BM components helped to resolve such conflicts between the old and the new BM. We observed 
that the drifting pattern allowed firms to identify such lack of synergy earlier in the process.
Although it might be argued that a broader BM portfolio, like Philips had, increases options for 
reuse and synergy, this did not appear decisive for the nature of BM innovation trajectories, as we 
find a similar “drifting” pattern in one of the other firms with only one main BM (i.e. Van 
Gansewinkel). This indicates that the number of BMs in a portfolio does not explain much of our 
findings. More broadly, size does not appear to differentiate between the two patterns. The two 
companies that are smaller in size in terms of employees, FEI and Bruns, displayed the leaping 
pattern, whereas the bigger firms displayed the drifting pattern. However, this association is likely 
to be accidental and not causal because existing theory suggests that if size would have an effect, 
it would point in the opposite direction: prior research found that smaller firms tend to use more 
emergent and less planned approaches than large firms (e.g. Berends et al., 2014), whereas in the 
present study, the two bigger firms started in a more emergent way.
Boundary conditions, limitations, and further research
Several boundary conditions and limitations of our study deserve to be mentioned and addressed 
in future research. We investigated four cases that were similar in several ways, which invites 
additional studies of BM innovation trajectories in other settings. In particular, our findings refer 
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to BM innovations that were new for their sectors, which imply extensive learning in these trajec-
tories. The process of BM innovation may differ when a BM follows a recipe or existing exemplar 
(Baden-Fuller and Morgan, 2010). Learning trajectories may be less complex in such situations, 
and followers’ approaches may involve more learning from external sources, whereas the cases we 
studied drew primarily on their own analyses and experiences. Our findings also pertain to cases in 
which new BMs complement existing BMs instead of substituting for them. The dynamics may 
differ when a new BM needs to replace an old one (Kim and Min, 2015) because the competition 
for attention and resources may strengthen the role of inertia.
The organizations that executed the BM innovation trajectories were regarded mostly as a whole, 
ignoring any intra-organizational social dynamics and micro-institutional effects. Any innovation 
effort that deviates from an organization’s existing businesses likely faces internal resistance, dealing 
with which requires leadership (Chesbrough, 2007) and political maneuvering (Van Dijk et al., 2011). 
While drifting may potentially help alleviate some of the resistance, additional research is needed to 
investigate how intra-organizational dynamics shape BM learning processes. Finally, we did not 
include performance as a variable in our analysis. We only selected BM innovations that came to frui-
tion, without differentiating their ultimate contributions to firm performance. To extend this study, 
researchers should investigate the performance consequences of different learning trajectories.
Conclusion
BM innovation is a complex process in which action and cognition intertwine. It is not a two-step 
process of conception and execution, in which a BM is developed first as a cognitive representation 
and then implemented in reality later. Instead, it is a multi-step, multi-mechanism learning process 
that can occur through “drifting” and “leaping” patterns. In addition to considering which BM will 
be most effective, organizations therefore should consider how they can arrange an effective learn-
ing process to reach a novel BM.
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Appendix 1
Episodes in the business model innovation trajectories*
*Business model components that interact during a particular episode are highlighted in bold. 
Codes between brackets refer to interview sources.
Table 4. Phenom (FEI).
Episode Description
1 2003: Reinvigorating old idea for 
“tabletop SEM”
CONCEPTUALIZATION: FEI envisages potential 
applications for an innovative miniature “column,” a 
technological resource for electron microscopy. After 
abandoning another potential application, FEI advances the 
idea to deliver a “tabletop SEM,” with a value proposition 
that could be positioned in between optical microscopes 
and SEMs. This entails that it had to be cheap, fast, and 
easy to use. This value proposition set targets for a cost 
structure: “If you want to sell—and at that time we were 
thinking about 30,000 Euro—you should get if manufactured for 
no more than 15,000” (F6).
2 2003–February 2005: Development 
of technology and prototype
CREATION: The roughly conceived value proposition 
and cost structure drive the development of technological 
resources. “It is more than just the column in the heart of the 
machine. So we looked at system aspects, that it would be a self-
contained system with all functionalities” (F10). Breakthroughs 
were needed concerning vacuum technology and fast loading 
of samples. “And all had to be cheap, that was maybe the most 
difficult of all. Costs were the main theme in the project” (F10). 
These breakthroughs were realized, and a prototype of a 
small electron microscope was presented in February 2005.
3 2005 (February): Developing 
business plan, identifying market 
gap, customer segments
CONCEPTUALIZATION: A dedicated team works on 
developing “a business case.” The broad value proposition 
gets refined and guides search for specific customer 
segments. “FEI was in the top of the pyramid. The market 
is not big, but you are high-end super duper. So if you want to 
grow, you have to broaden your base, go down in the pyramid. 
That means less high-end” (F1). “First, we looked at the way the 
market is structured. There is a gap between high-end electron 
microscopes and optical microscopes. So if you want to fill that 
gap, for whom might that be an interesting product?” (F7).
4 2005 (February): Starting 
collaboration with development 
partners
CREATION: Creation of partnership with suppliers on a 
“risk-reward” basis as “solution” for manufacturing activities 
because FEI has little financial resources available for product 
development and industrialization and these suppliers aim to 
become value added suppliers. “There was no money within FEI 
to start projects, so they had to find creative funding opportunities. 
Then, [supplier] and [supplier] joined as co-investors, and that 
was the way to pull it forward” (F2). This partnership changed 
potential revenues and development costs because the 
partners were took a larger share of revenues in return 
for sharing risk and were used to work with tight cost 
structures instead of FEI’s focus on high-end solutions.
(Continued)
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Episode Description
5 2005: Identifying different use cases CONCEPTUALIZATION: Based on extensive 
interviewing, project members identified different “use 
cases” that specify the value proposition of the tabletop 
microscope for specific customers. “There was a vision of 
a cheap SEM, but it was not a product at all. It only became 
a product when we started thinking about who will use it and 
for what purpose” (F3). It was envisioned that potential 
customers were those who could not afford an electron 
microscope. Specific use cases concerned forensic research 
(e.g. investigating bullets) and materials research (e.g. 
surfaces).
6 2005: Start industrialization with 
multi-disciplinary team
CREATION: The refined value proposition for envisaged 
customer segments (“use cases”) was used to guide 
further development of technological resources. “We 
optimized the device for that” (F3). This technological 
development is materialized with the partners, who 
take care of realizing the cost structure. “I had a weekly 
operational meeting with the most important players involved. 
People from [supplier], FEI, [supplier], [supplier] were there, 
other suppliers if it was necessary. Then a number of sub-
teams for mechanics, software, electronics, who were busy with 
engineering” (F2).
7 2005: Exploring distribution and 
sales with partners
CREATION: Because envisioned customers were 
not yet served by FEI and resources were limited, the 
project team searched for sales partners. After a failed 
attempt to distribute the tabletop SEM through optical 
microscope companies, FEI sets up a partnership with 
a sales outsourcing organization to develop distribution 
channels and customer relationships with conceived 
customer segments. “[Project Manager] got in contact with 
people who were into sales outsourcing and lead generation, 
and those were things that we knew we needed, because we 
will not just run into customers, certainly not enough customers” 
(F1). They agreed fee for the partner reduced potential 
revenues.
8 2006: Doing Alpha and Beta testing 
with prototype products in the 
market
EXPERIMENTING: Based on the initial definition 
of customer segments, potential customers are 
approached to test the value proposition of a beta 
version. This beta testing continues with the formal 
product introduction (as “Phenom”) at “The Instrument” 
fair. “Out of 35 people that we interviewed, we kept about 10 
or 8 people who we asked to become a beta client (…) Being 
a beta client means that you get it somewhat cheaper, but 
you have to work for it, and you have to respect that it will not 
always work properly. But we do not want to offer crap. We 
prefer to offer something where you can work with and that 
offers us useful feedback” (F1).
Table 4. (Continued)
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Episode Description
9 2007: Sales far below expectation 
leading to redefinition of market 
segment
ADAPTATION: Based upon experiences in the first year, 
with sales far below expectations, customer segment and 
value proposition are redefined. “After the launch, hell broke 
loose. One of the biggest mistakes of the business plan is that we 
would attack the market for optical microscopy. We would grab the 
market for high-end optical microscopy. Those devices were more 
expensive than ours, but more limited. But we did not succeed at all. 
Those people did not know what a SEM could do for them. Funnily 
enough, to whom did we sell the most? To FEI customers” (F1). 
For those existing customers, the value proposition of the 
Phenom was complementary to their high-end SEMs: Phenom 
for high volume tasks, and a high-end SEM for more demanding 
tasks. FEI redefined customer segment as “SEM data users”, 
who know the value of an SEM, but cannot afford one.
10 2008: Experimenting with sales 
approach
EXPERIMENTATION: Because sales are not satisfactory, 
people at FEI experiment with alternative distribution 
channels using different media to generate awareness of the 
Phenom and identify potential customers (“leads”): “So, it is 
a real problem how to communicate about this product. Actually, 
it is the lead generation problem, and [Marketing manager] 
experimented a lot with that” (F6).
11 2009: Suppliers buy Phenom 
business from FEI
ADAPTATION: Due to disappointing sales, FEI decided to 
stop investing in the tabletop electron microscope business 
and spin out the Phenom business. The other partners 
take a larger share of the new company to avoid losing 
business-specific investments, and FEI keeps a minority share, 
thereby changing the nature of the partnership. The spinoff 
company is called PhenomWorld: “The size of the business 
fitted better in the company that we are now” (F10).
12 2009: Start adapting distribution 
structure and sales approach
ADAPTATION: The new business entity adapts distribution 
channels and customer relationships, because team 
members learned that these were designed for selling large 
and complex microscopes and did not fit the value proposition 
and cost and revenue structure of the Phenom. “You find 
out that Phenom was an odd man out within FEI. It requires a 
completely different market approach than traditional SEMs” (F7). 
New distributors replaced existing agents:“Now we have our 
own distributors for whom we represent a substantial part of their 
turnover. So they will work and invest to realize that turnover” (F1).
13 2009: Introducing new software 
and accessories
CREATION: Aiming to further specifiy the value 
proposition of its tabletop microscope for refined 
customer segments in different industries, PhenomWorld 
develops new technological resources to introduce new 
software and accessories. The customers typically need to 
use the Phenom for a specific application. “If you want to grow, 
you need to do other things. Develop smart applications, develop 
smart holders, bring it up to date. We know what our next step is. 
We had a very good strategy session last year, with someone from 
outside, who knows electron microscopy well” (F1).
Table 4. (Continued)
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Table 5. Exhibits.nl (Bruns).
Episode Description
1 2006: Bruns considers a new 
business idea: Standardized exhibits
CONCEPTUALIZATION: Bruns formulates a new 
value proposition, standardized exhibits, based on 
existing designs from their traditional business: “There 
are still so many potential clients (…) they just want to have 
a good [standardized] exhibit for a good price, no more 
and no less (…) we had a hunch that there was a market 
for that” (B4) and receives initial approval from their 
traditional customers that they would be OK if Bruns 
would pursue this opportunity. The traditional customers 
would receive some revenues when one of their designs 
would be sold (traditional customers become partners). 
“With representatives of some leading museums, we checked 
whether they would support the idea” (B9) “because we 
developed the designs with them” (B5) “If an exhibit would be 
sold, [leading museums of the world] would get a part of the 
revenues” (B4).
2 2006: Bruns scans the need for the 
new business idea at a large trade 
fair
CONCEPTUALIZATION: Bruns conducts market 
research at a large trade fair to find out what participants 
think about the new value proposition and identifies 
that Bruns could bring value. “During Excite 2006 [trade-
fair] we checked how people reacted [to the concept]; we 
noticed there was a particular need” (B4). CREATION: To 
further conduct market research, Bruns creates a new 
channel: A small portion of the Bruns stand is dedicated 
to the new BM. “We actually started (…) with a small 
group; we had a stand of 3 by 2” (B6).
3 2006: Identifying small museums, 
queues at theme parks, and 
shopping malls as market focus
CONCEPTUALIZATION: Supported by the positive 
experiences at the trade fair, Bruns identifies new 
customer segments “We have said (…) small museums, 
(…), queues at theme parks, this is what we thought of 
beforehand. And indeed ordinary shopping malls” (B1) and 
conceptualizes costs: “There are many potential clients who 
need exhibits that are of high quality, but often do not want all 
kinds of bells and whistles, because that raises the price” (B6) 
and customer relationships “[Customers] have to come 
pick it up. Do you want it sent, or you want a box around it, 
okay, but then you get an additional charge” (B1).
4 2006: Working with a design 
agency as strategic partner
CREATION: Realizing their lack of competences in 
redesign, Bruns formalizes a relationship with a design 
agency (partner) that conducts specific activities such 
as the development of aesthetical and visual aspects of 
the designs: “At a certain moment, we worked out the idea 
with a design office”(B1). “Well as you see, the exhibits, the 
technical part has all been built once, but it’s the design. It 
must also have a certain market value, so it needs to have a 
certain look. And therefore you need a design office.” (B1) 
This partner gets a strategic role in the new BM by 
retaining 50% of the generated revenues: “But were they 
owner? Yes, 50%. Each had 50% of the business” (B4).
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5 2007: Development of a website 
as the main communication and 
distribution channel for Exhibits.nl
CREATION: By developing a website for 
communication and distribution, a channel is created 
including a catalog of standardized exhibits: “In the 
beginning, we had 80 exhibits on the website” (B5) for a 
fixed price (revenue model). “People can download a pdf 
from the website when filling in an email address. So we get 
a message and I (…) send them a price list and the general 
terms” (B6) CONCEPTUALIZATION: Because the 
design agency develops graphical designs of the initial 
set exhibits for the website, the value proposition 
is further developed to include aesthetical appearance. 
“And so gradually a whole lot of stuff was thought out, 
mainly only on paper (…) when there were orders, we went 
building these things and solving all the problems you then 
encounter” (B9)
6 2008: Presentation of Exhibits.nl 
as a clear alternative to Bruns at 
yearly trade fair
ADAPTATION: Triggered by actually operating the 
business from 2007 onwards, Bruns creates a separate 
stand (channel) at the yearly trade fair for Exhibits.nl 
instead of using a small portion on the Bruns stand. “[In 
2008] we decided for a double stand at Ecsite [trade-fair], 
one for Exhibits.nl and one for Bruns” (B4).
7 2008: Adjusting after-sales service 
and introducing procedures
ADAPTATION: Running the business results in gradual 
adaptation of intended customer relationships: “Initially 
the idea was that the customer would order, we would ship, 
and when the product is damaged the customer sends it 
back. In practice it does not work like this, and sometimes 
we still visit the customer to solve the problem.” Internally, 
this implies that Bruns has to work with standardized 
components instead of ad-hoc solutions, choose 
components that are not likely to disappear from the 
market, and do proper documentation. This is done by 
evaluating each project and refining activities. “We were 
used to build everything only a single time. To do things in 
repetition, you get into a different way of thinking (…) you 
need to think carefully whether the part is still for sale in a few 
years (…) We evaluate all projects with stakeholders, which 
results in adjustments and choices. You’re constantly refining 
and fine-tuning”(B9)
8 2009: Expanding market scope to 
include emerging economies
ADAPTATION: Based on executed projects and 
website requests, the market scope (customer 
segments) is expanded toward emerging economies 
such as countries from the Middle East, South America, 
and Asia. “Our market scope has enlarged, now we are much 
more active in the Middle East, such as in Turkey.” (B1). “Did 
Exhibits.nl bring new customers? Yes (…) such as parties from 
South America; we are shipping exhibits to South America 
now” (B9).
(Continued)
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Episode Description
9 2010 (Spring): Ending the 
partnership with the design agency
ADAPTATION: Bruns gradually learns from 
experience to change the partnership with the design 
agency because the agency has a decreasing impact 
on value creation and retains a substantial portion of 
revenues. This leads to dissolution of the partnership. 
“The role of the design agency changed after a number of 
years because only very few detailed designs were needed. 
Their input was actually only with the website and the like” 
(B3). “It was decided to just buy out [design agency]. We still 
work with them in large projects [in the traditional business]. 
If there are new exhibits for Exhibits.nl (…) we now outsource 
the design to them” (B1).
10 2011 (Spring): Appointing 
commercial assistant for Exhibits.nl
ADAPTATION: From experience, Bruns learns 
that to utilize the commercial potential of Exhibits.
nl, its commercial director needs additional support; a 
commercial assistant is appointed (additional resource) 
for better and quicker customer interaction (customer 
relations). “The concept is (…): potential customers receive 
information via the website (…) so you soon get requests for 
information. During the day I had barely time for this, and I 
often responded in the evening or at night; I gave an answer, 
and that was it. Sometimes something got out of this, other 
times not. Sometimes you had personal contact, but we 
wanted a more constant factor for this, and also the fact that 
we wanted to grow naturally. Anyway, to be able to produce 
more” (B3).
Table 5. (Continued)
Table 6. MiPlaza (Philips).
Episode Description
1 2004 (June): Research 
support services for 
micro, nano, and bio R&D 
are identified as business 
opportunity
CONCEPTUALIZATION: Opening up Philips R&D campus 
to outside parties leads to seeing Philips’ research support 
services in a new light, as business opportunity (dubbed 
MiPlaza), and identifying a value proposition, activities, 
resources, and customers “We thought of things that could 
make the campus a success and then we came up with MiPlaza 
(…) it became obvious to [explicitly] open up our research services 
to third parties” (P7) and revenues and costs “In 2004, 4% of 
the revenues already came from parties outside Philips” (P1) “In 
the future it could become harder to finance our base infrastructure, 
this would be much easier if we shared this infrastructure with third 
parties” (P7).
2 2004: Start collaboration with 
equipment manufacturers
ADAPTATION: Based on ongoing operations, MiPlaza’s 
customer base is broadened, which triggers some of MiPlaza’s 
testing equipment suppliers to inform if MiPlaza is willing to 
share user information: “We had different types of customers doing 
different things and then suppliers become interested and want to be 
part of that” (P3). This leads to new partnership agreements 
between several equipment suppliers and MiPlaza, in which
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MiPlaza can use state of the art testing equipment against 
reduces cost and the sharing of test results. These partnerships 
reduce MiPlaza’s equipment costs: “Equipment suppliers now 
put in place equipment because a lot of companies are working 
with it and that is interesting for them, so [the customer base] 
becomes and asset” (P7). “Instead of buying equipment, you enter a 
partnership” (P3).
3 2005: Appointment of 
a business development 
manager for MiPlaza
ADAPTATION: Based on growing operations: “The need for 
research support services was growing by itself, we did not have to 
do very intelligent things for that, people were just knocking on our 
door.” (P7) it is realized that MiPlaza is in need of an additional 
resource for business development: “we needed someone to 
think with us about organization, that we had proper invoices and 
that everything had the brand ‘MiPlaza’. These kind of things.” 
(P7) Therefore a full-time business development manager is 
appointed: “I approached [Business development manager] who got 
on board” (P7). This appointment created a clearer customer 
interface and sales channel: “ [Business development manager] 
became a central figure when dealing with new and potential 
customers, to develop a uniform approach” (P3).
4 2005: Important customers 
get involved in a steering 
committee
ADAPTATION: Based on broadening operations, customer 
relationships are strengthened by involving important 
customers in the steering committee of one of MiPlaza’s 
departments. This committee decides on what equipment is 
purchased and on ways of working. “From 2005 onwards also 
some important [and new] external customers, such as Holst Centre 
are members [of steering committee]. This committee decides on 
what equipment has to be purchased and on ways of working” (P4).
5 2006: MiPlaza is formalized as 
a separate division (sector) 
within Philips
ADAPTATION: Due to the ongoing broadening of MiPlaza’s 
client base and new large customers, MiPlaza is increasingly 
becoming more different than ordinary research groups that do 
not serve outside customers. “Then […] came as large customers, 
before that we only had smaller clients. This made it all more serious. 
For example contracting took more time and service reliability 
became much more important (P4). This leads to the decision by 
upper management to formalize MiPlaza as a separate division 
within Philips and create two additional resources: a MiPlaza 
general manager at Vice President level and a communication 
manager:“In 2006 upper management decided to further broaden 
our initial success and MiPlaza became a separate division” (P4) “A 
Vice President is officially leading MiPlaza from Sep. 1, 2006.” (P1) 
“Next to [VP] a communication manager was installed because there 
was a need for proper communication.” (P2) This development also 
has consequences for the revenue stream. From now on both 
internal and external customers pay ‘fees for service’; earlier 
‘R&D cost allocations’ were used for internal customers: “When 
we became a separate division we started charging both internal and 
external customers in the same way” (P3).
(Continued)
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Episode Description
6 2006–2007: “One MiPlaza” 
change program: Analysis 
is executed and points 
of attention for further 
development are explicated
CONCEPTUALIZATION: The “One MiPlaza” change 
program is initiated by the newly appointed Vice President to 
strengthen the integration of the separate research departments 
that are now part of the new division and further develop the 
business. The program started with a “gap” analysis: based 
on employee and customer interviews gaps were identified 
between the current situation and the desired situation. Based 
on this analysis, focus points for further development and 
strengthening MiPlaza’s value proposition become more 
explicit: “Interviews and a survey with employees and customers (…) 
resulted in identifying gaps [between MiPlaza’s services and customer 
demand] that had to be worked on.” (P1): business acumen 
(activities and resources), customer relationships, market 
orientation (activities and resources) and the management 
of IP (activities and resources): “People did not have a sense 
for business and making profit, handling customer relationships was 
difficult, they were not driven by market orientation, and managing IP 
issues was a challenge” (P1).
7 2008: Training MiPlaza 
researchers on IP 
management
CREATION: Based on the early phases of the One 
MiPlaza change program, MiPlaza researchers are trained in 
IP management: “All employees got IP management training” 
(P5) This creates new resources for MiPlaza and impacts 
activities: “We have this framework for IP management that we 
apply as much as possible. It supports our work because we all 
use the same practices” (P9) and it also strengthens the value 
proposition: “Customers see good IP management as important 
and we have to take care of potential IP leakages; our employees 
are trained for that” (P4).
8 2008: Introducing “process 
house” and gaining ISO 
certification
CREATION: The “One MiPlaza” analysis phase had 
highlighted that there were little division-wide procedures 
and much ad-hoc activities: “Everyone could do everything and 
start with things whenever they wanted” (P1) To get a grip on 
the business, a Business Excellence manager was appointed 
and a “process house” was introduced which received 
ISO certification at the end of 2008: “A Business Excellence 
Manager was appointed in 2008.” (P2) “The ‘process house’ was 
introduced in 2008 and gained ISO certification at the end of 
that year” (P1). These new resources also strengthened the 
MiPlaza value proposition: “ISO certification also increases 
the value of services to our clients. Because you have ISO people 
are assured that your processes are okay, because they are 
monitored by an external institute.” (P5) ISO certification 
and the process house also had an influence on activities: 
“Employees became responsible for describing and improving 
processes” (P5).
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9 2008: Installing business 
creation team (BCT)
CREATION: The “One MiPlaza” analysis phase had 
revealed that the management of customer relationships 
and market orientation was not at the desirable level. The 
aspiration to improve the commercial side of the business 
leads to investments in additional resources which 
strengthened customer relationship management: hiring two 
sales managers and an experienced marketing manager. “There 
was a need to move from an internally focused organization to a 
commercial organization, for example increase our presence at 
trade-fairs, that’s why we recruited sales people. They had to take 
over the commercial tasks of the researchers” (P3). “In 2008, 
two sales managers and an experienced marketing manager were 
hired” (P1).
10 2008: Developing market 
segmentation
ADAPTATION: Initially, MiPlaza focused on areas that were 
in the scope of Philips’ business units, which had always been 
their internal customers: “Based on our heritage, we focused on the 
semiconductor and healthcare industries” (P3). Ongoing operations 
lead to the realization that MiPlaza’s research services are 
also of interest for (potential) customers that operate outside 
this scope such as the solar market. “We found out that thin 
film analyses are also very useful in the solar domain” (P3). This 
triggers the explicit refinement of customer segments and a 
more focused use of sales channels: “Market segmentation and 
developing focus teams started in 2008. This focused our visits to 
trade-fairs” (P3).
BM: business model; ISO: International Organization for Standardization
Table 6. (Continued)
Table 7. “Waste no More” (Van Gansewinkel).
Episode Description
1 2006: Reinterpretation 
of existing activities 
inspired by documentary
CONCEPTUALIZATION: A documentary on waste as “raw 
materials” on Dutch television (“VPRO Tegenlicht”) inspires a 
reconceptualization of Van Gansewinkel’s existing activities, 
resources, and revenue stream. It was recognized that Van 
Gansewinkel already recycled and sold recycled materials on a 
small scale, but they now conceive this as value proposition 
“At the core there already was something that related to recycling, 
but through this external trigger, pretty much the documentary, we 
realized that this could be our future business case.” (V10). This 
value proposition could be delivered to existing customers, 
with whom they had existing relationships, via existing 
distribution channels: “It was not the case that we just focused on 
raw materials. We took into account with which customers we had a 
good relationship, and who we saw at conferences” (V9).
(Continued)
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Episode Description
2 2007 (May): Starting 
collaboration with NGO 
EPEA, which promotes 
the cradle-to-cradle 
(C2C) approach
CREATION: Van Gansewinkel contracts NGO EPEA 
(Environmental Protection Encouragement Agency) as partner 
which provides knowledge (resources) to further develop 
recycling capabilities and to become a “cradle-to-cradle” 
expert: “Our partnership with EPEA is broad but has a lot to do with 
knowledge” (V13). The link with EPEA also strengthens the value 
proposition because an increasing number of companies want 
to certify C2C products with EPEA and Van Gansewinkel, as a 
recycler, can facilitate closing the loop. “[Partnership] has clear 
mutual benefits. EPEA deals with organizations that want to certify, 
and they refer them to us to close the loop, and we promote the C2C 
philosophy at our customers” (V3). Because EPEA refers potential 
customers to Van Gansewinkel, the collaboration also creates a 
new channel.
3 2007: First projects on 
recycling
EXPERIMENTATION: Exploratory projects on reuse of 
materials are executed as a proof of concept of the new BM 
and value proposition. “The first project with Philips was just a 
simple tray of recycled materials. It has cost us both a lot of money, 
but it has been an investment in demonstrating that we can do it, 
that it is possible, as the start of something much larger” (V4). In 
these projects, Van Gansewinkel is working closer together 
with customers than it ever did. “With Philips we worked together 
very intensively” (V12). Therefore, executing these projects also 
affects customer relationships.
4 2008: First cradle-to-
cradle project
EXPERIMENTATION: Representatives from Mosa, a tile 
company, and Van Gansewinkel meet at a conference. From 
the enthusiasm of both sides, a C2C project is born and 
together they start business development experiments with the 
collection and recycling of ceramics. This is a test case for Van 
Gansewinkel to see what value they can bring in C2C projects 
(value proposition). “Mosa was also one of the first projects 
(…) we are still working on that. At the moment, Mosa is testing 
all kinds of C2C tiles and is involved in ‘take-back’ trials” (V12). 
(Potential) customers participating in C2C projects, like Mosa, 
are also seen as partners in the further development of the 
C2C philosophy: “As partners, we [Mosa and Van Gansewinkel] 
strengthen each other’s market position; our common philosophy 
appeals to a variety of companies.” (Sales manager Van Gansewinkel 
in annual report).
5 2009: Set-up of C2C 
board, executive 
committee, and 
development team
ADAPTATION: Based on ongoing operations and an increase 
in projects the need for control emerges. Therefore, it is 
decided to develop a more formal structure, which structures 
activities. “We had about 160 projects (…) and then the 
problem becomes how to manage these. So very early we developed 
a C2C development team which is a sort of structure…” (V13) 
“[Coordination mechanisms] grew organically. We had the executive 
committee (…) and the development team” (V9)
Table 7. (Continued)
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6 2009: Many employees 
are sent to the C2C 
academy in Hamburg 
with EPEA and 
“knowledge cafés” are 
organized
CREATION: Based on BM conceptualization the plan is 
developed and executed to send the company’s top 200 
employees to EPEA for training on C2C in 2009 en 2010. Some 
also learned to give internal training on C2C. Although this 
raises operating costs significantly, knowledge on C2C and 
recycling (resources) is further developed Also “knowledge 
cafes” are organized for internal knowledge sharing. “In 2009 our 
CEO encouraged the top 200 to go to Hamburg to learn about the 
C2C philosophy; 15 of them also give internal training sessions, so we 
have a training structure in place (…) we really invested in training, 
even in the midst of the financial crisis” (V12) “We do a lot of 
‘knowledge cafés. I think these are a good vehicle to share knowledge 
and keep people enthusiastic” (V9)
7 2009: Introduction 
of “waste no 
more” as corporate 
communication
CREATION: The slogan “waste no more” is developed by the 
corporate communications department both to claim a position 
in the market and to crystallize the new direction internally. 
The development of this resource further explicates the value 
proposition “We developed the pay off ‘waste no more’ (…) to 
claim our position in the market and to show internally the direction 
we wanted to go” (V2)
8 2010: Market analysis is 
done to guide further 
development of the 
business model
CONCEPTUALIZATION: An analysis of material markets 
is done to determine a more focused BM based on high-quality 
recycling and closing loops in particular material supply chains. 
This results in the conceptualization of several customer 
segments as focus areas “We started focusing on different 
materials supply chains such as plastics.”(V9) “This started in the 
heads of people, and this was discussed by the C2C development 
team.” (V12), a sharper value proposition and an increased 
focus on costs and revenues. “There was consensus that we had 
to be able to develop material flows, otherwise it would be difficult 
for Van Gansewinkel to develop a solid financial model” (V7) “now 
we focus on 10 projects that must have a solid business case in 
2014” (V4).
9 2010 (October): Start 
new department 
Materials, Concepts, and 
Infrastructure (MCI)
CREATION: Partly based on the market analysis, several 
support departments are regrouped under a new name (MCI), 
thereby giving more attention to the identified customer 
segments and restructuring activities and resources. 
“In 2010 we started focusing on several topics, and MCI is the 
organizational output of this” (V2). “[In 2010] we developed MCI 
which combines several of our traditional departments (…) With MCI 
we focus on the new way of thinking about waste (…) it includes 
several people that are fully dedicated to C2C projects” (V12). “The 
formation of MCI is the first significant structural organizational 
change” (V10).
EPEA: Environmental Protection Encouraging Agency; NGO: non-governmental organization.
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Table 8. Phenom (FEI).
Original BM: FEI Episodes (see Table 4) Final BM: Phenom
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
VP High-end electron 
microscope systems 
focused on performance 
with extensive service
x x x x x x Small, easy to use, affordable 
tabletop microscope systems 
with low-cost service
A R&D, manufacturing, 
marketing, and sales of 
low-volume high-end 
complex microscope 
systems
x R&D outsourced; more 
standardized manufacturing and 
design; transactional marketing 
and sales of mid-volume 
microscope systems, with 
heavy reliance on partners
R World-leading electron 
microscopy technology
x x x x Low-cost technology
P Suppliers for 
component 
manufacturing
x x x Suppliers for development 
and integrated manufacturing 
according to risk-reward model 
and distributors for sales
Co No strong cost 
orientation. Gross 
profit margin around 
40 %
x x Costs per unit are a lot lower. 
Gross profit margin is similar, 
but higher volume needed to 
cover fixed costs
CS Leading research 
institutes, national 
laboratories, and 
companies
x x x x x Schools and companies that use 
SEM data, but cannot afford a 
typical, expensive SEM
CR Building long-term 
relationships
x x More transactional 
relationships
Ch Own sales force x x x Distributers and own sales 
force
Rev System sales and service 
agreements
x x System sales and service 
agreements, and risk-reward 
arrangement with suppliers
VP: value proposition; A: activities; R: resources; P: partners; Co: cost structure; CS: customer segments; CR: customer 
relationships; Ch: channels; Rev: revenue streams.
Appendix 2
Changes in business models over time
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Table 9. Exhibits.nl (Bruns).
Original BM: Bruns Episodes (see Table 5) Final BM: Exhibits.nl
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
VP Tailor-made interactive 
exhibits
x x x Standardized, sharply priced, and 
shockproof exhibits with limited 
complexity and limited after-sales 
service, derived from tailor-made 
exhibits
A Engineering and 
production of novel 
technical designs on 
project basis
x x Standardized production and sales of 
exhibits
R Project management, 
engineering, marketing/
sales capabilities; 
manufacturing facility
x Manufacturing and marketing/sales 
capabilities. Set of standardized designs 
based on prior customized projects.
P Project partners such as 
designers
x x x A design agency for aesthetic design 
aspects. Customers of the original 
Bruns BM that own the designs and get 
a fee per standardized exhibit sold
Co Design, engineering, 
manufacturing, 
marketing/sales costs
x Redesign, manufacturing, marketing/
sales costs
CS Leading museums and 
science centers, visitor 
centers and traveling 
exhibitions, mainly in 
Western Europe
x x Smaller museums and science centers 
with limited budget; shopping malls, 
queues in theme parks in W. Europe; 
emerging economies such as Turkey
CR Customer-centric 
approach using face-
to-face interaction and 
building relationships. 
Extensive after-sales 
service
x x x Fast efficient contact and 
communication with (potential) clients 
via website and e-mail (no physical 
client interaction); exhibits sent by 
post; limited after-sales service
Ch Trade fair, sales 
managers
x x x Separate stand on trade fair, dedicated 
website listing exhibits
Rev Pay per project (hour 
driven)
x x x x Pay per standardized exhibit (fixed 
price)/Some revenues to partners
VP: value proposition; A: activities; R: resources; P: partners; Co: cost structure; CS: customer segments; CR: customer 
relationships; Ch: channels; Rev: revenue streams.
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Table 10. MiPlaza (Philips).
Original BM: Philips 
Research
Episodes (see Table 6) Final BM: MiPlaza
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
VP State-of-the-art research 
support services along the 
concept realization process
x x x x ISO-certified state-of-the-art 
research support services and IP 
management expertise along the 
concept realization process
A Execution of research 
support activities
x x x x Systemized execution and marketing 
of research support services and the 
management of IP issues
R Research facilities and 
researchers
x x x x x x x Research facilities, researchers, 
marketing/sales managers, 
framework for IP management
P Strategic suppliers of test 
equipment
x Strategic suppliers of test equipment 
of which some receive user 
information in return for lower 
equipment prices
Co Costs for keeping 
equipment and expertise up 
to date
x x Costs for keeping equipment and 
expertise up to date, marketing/
sales costs
CS Medical equipment, 
consumer electronics, and 
lighting (Philips business 
sectors)
x x Semiconductors, healthcare, solar, 
Philips business sectors
CR Long-term close 
relationships with internal 
customers and some 
external “old friends”
x x x (1) Transaction based relationships 
with organizations that make use of 
research facilities only once for a 
short period of time (2) Long-term 
close relationship with co-creation 
clients, with organizations that 
repeatedly make use of services, and 
internal customers
Ch Creating awareness through 
informal relationships 
between researchers and 
employees from Philips 
business sectors
x x Creating awareness via trade fairs, 
selling via sales managers for all 
clients
Rev Internal R&D cost 
allocations and sporadically 
some fees from external 
clients
x x Fees for services for both internal 
and external customers
VP: value proposition; A: activities; R: resources; P: partners; Co: cost structure; CS: customer segments; CR: customer 
relationships; Ch: channels; Rev: revenue streams; ISO: International Organization for Standardization.
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Table 11. Waste no more (Van Gansewinkel).
Original BM: Van 
Gansewinkel
Episodes (see Table 7) Final BM: Waste no more
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
VP Offering waste management 
services
x x x x x x Offering recycled materials and 
consultancy services focused 
on “design for recycling,” and 
acting as facilitator in cradle-
to-cradle (C2C) projects
A Collecting, sorting, and 
processing waste
x x x Collecting, sorting, processing, 
recycling, and selling materials; 
offering consultancy services
R Marketing/sales capabilities, 
a dense logistics network, 
machinery to separate 
waste, and contracts with 
reliable downstream waste 
processing companies
x x x x x Marketing/sales capabilities, 
a dense logistics network, 
machinery to separate and 
recycle materials, recycling and 
C2C knowledge
P Specialized downstream 
waste processors that 
further process waste 
streams that are not 
processed by Van 
Gansewinkel itself
x x Knowledge partner EPEA. 
Companies and other 
organizations that participate 
in C2C projects
Co Costs of marketing and sales 
and machinery
x x Costs of marketing and 
sales, machinery, and keeping 
knowledge up-to-date
CS Companies, other 
organizations, and 
households (via 
municipalities)
x x x OEMs and other 
manufacturers of products
CR Long-term transactional 
relationships
x x Close relationships: co-
creation of value together with 
customers in projects
Ch Contact and sales via own 
sales force
x x Contact and sales via own 
sales force and project 
managers. Sometimes new 
customers via EPEA
Rev Income from selling waste 
management services
x x Income from selling materials 
and consultancy services and 
facilitating C2C projects
VP: value proposition; A: activities; R: resources; P: partners; Co: cost structure; CS: customer segments; CR: customer 
relationships; Ch: channels; Rev: revenue streams.
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